By Ema Ivarature, ‘Akanesi Katoa, Henry Ivarature
A healthy democracy is often measured by how well it enables citizens to take part in the political process, with voter turnout and participation in civil-society groups serving as key indicators of public engagement.
Yet as Tonga’s parliament elects its prime minister on 15 December 2025, democratic gains risk being diluted if executive power consolidates around nobility rather than the people’s representatives.
Tonga, the only kingdom in the Pacific, undertook major political and democratic reforms in 2010 to strengthen political participation, including shifting power away from the monarch and increasing voters’ participation in political leadership and governance.
Tonga’s democratic transformation is ongoing. But after 15 years, there are signs indicating the monarchy and nobility are again assuming a greater role in governance and government. The general elections on 20 November 2025 — which filled 17 peoples’ representative seats and nine noble seats — may mark a shift from government led by the people to one increasingly dominated by the nobles.
With the demise of major political groups, the race for prime minister is now amongst independents in two camps — the nobles’ and people’s representatives — and hinges on how each strategically mobilises support.
Lord Fatafehi Fakafanua, a nobles’ representative and incumbent speaker of parliament, is a potential candidate for prime minister. The prospect of a noble leading the government has been publicly endorsed by another elected noble, Lord Vaea. Noble prime ministers are not unprecedented — Lord Tu‘ivakano held the role in 2010 immediately following Tonga’s democratic reforms. But Fakafanua will need the support of the 17 people’s representatives to secure the position. The contest remains open, with considerable deal making and political negotiations among potential contenders.
Unlike the 17 people’s representatives, the nine nobles’ representatives are not chosen by universal suffrage but are elected by about 30 individuals who hold Tonga’s 33 noble titles. If, as Lord Vaea argues, strong traditional leadership of nobles can steady political leadership in ways that have been lacking among people’s representative prime ministers, Lord Fakafanua may be well positioned to consolidate noble support.
Nobles’ representatives have generally voted as a unified bloc. Fakafanua’s own family connections are extensive — his first cousins are Lords Ma‘afu and Fotofili, who respectively represent Tongatapu and the Niuas, and his uncles are Lords Vaea and Tu‘iha‘angana, who represent Eua and Ha‘apai. He is also related to other elected nobles who could possibly lend support to his political bid. As the representative of Ha‘apai, Fakafanua may also persuade the two Ha‘apai people’s representatives to align with him. Though the 17 people’s representatives have traditionally dominated the election of a prime minister and the formation of government simply by virtue of their numbers, a well-organised noble coalition could alter that balance.
Competition for Fakafanua may come from former prime ministers — two people’s representatives, Siaosi Sovaleni and ‘Aisake Eke, as well as noble representative Lord Tu‘ivakano. Sovaleni and Eke are among the 10 people’s representatives who were re-elected in November 2025.
As the incumbent prime minister, Eke returns with four trusted ministers from his previous cabinet. During his term, Eke built a stable governing platform and repaired relations with the monarchy, including by appointing Crown Prince Tupouto‘a ‘Ulukalala as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence and supporting legislation that restored the monarch’s authority over foreign affairs. Eke and Sovaleni were re-elected with nearly three-quarters of the electorate vote in their constituencies — the highest vote shares in this election — but they stood against weak challengers and were expected to hold their seats.
Former prime minister Sovaleni resigned in December 2024 before facing a no-confidence motion. His position had been weakened by a prolonged standoff with the monarch who withdrew confidence in two key ministerial portfolios, leading to Sovaleni’s resignation and enabling Eke to assume office in January 2025. Two of Sovaleni’s ministers in his government were re-elected in the 2025 election, but whether they will support his premiership bid remains to be seen.
Former prime minister Tu‘ivakano, a seasoned MP and an old hand at political manoeuvring, was among the most outspoken critics of Sovaleni during the impasse between Sovaleni’s government and the monarch. Tu‘ivakano remains influential among his noble peers and to a certain degree, among the people’s representatives. He may choose to lend his support to Fakafanua.
These dynamics unfold against the backdrop of declining voter participation. Turnout has fallen at every election since the 2010 high of 91 per cent, with only 49.4 per cent of the 63,484 registered voters casting ballots in 2025. Possible explanations include migration, with an estimated 5000 Tongan labourers working on labour schemes in New Zealand and Australia, a nationwide fuel shortage on polling day which might have prevented voters from turning up to cast their ballots, and broader disengagement from the political process.
Women’s political participation also remains low. Of the eight women who contested the 2025 election, only one was successful. The sole incumbent female MP, Dulcie Tei, was challenged and defeated by another woman, Fane Fituafe.
To build a more representative political system, Tonga’s ongoing reforms must address declining voter turnout, encourage greater political participation by women and ensure that both people’s and nobles’ representatives engage meaningfully in shaping government.
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Ema Ivarature is a freelance researcher.
ʻAkanesi Katoa is a consultant and former Senior Crown Counsel in the Tongan Attorney General’s Office.
Henry Ivarature is Deputy Director of Strategic Engagements at the Pacific Security College, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
This article was fiirst published on 12 December 2025 https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/12/tongas-elections-at-a-democratic-cr...
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Based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University, East Asia Forum is the academic research network of the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER).
Comments
28 December 2025 Response to
28 December 2025 Response to Opinion: ‘Tonga’s elections at a democratic crossroads’ I write in response to the opinion article titled “Tonga’s elections at a democratic crossroads,” recently published on Matangi Tonga Online. While clearly presented as opinion, the article advances several claims about Tonga’s political system that mischaracterize its constitutional design and overstate the implications of current parliamentary dynamics.
The article repeatedly suggests that democratic gains in Tonga are at risk of being “diluted” by the influence of nobles and the monarchy. This framing is misleading. Under Tonga’s present constitutional system, the power to elect a prime minister and form a government rests decisively with the people’s representatives.
The Legislative Assembly comprises 17 people’s representatives and 9 nobles’ representatives. This numerical structure is deliberate and constitutionally decisive. Regardless of how the nobles vote, no prime minister can be elected and no government sustained without the support of the people’s representatives. Any political outcome in the House is therefore a consequence of how the 17 choose to exercise their discretion — not the will of the 9. To suggest otherwise ignores the most basic arithmetic of parliamentary power.
More fundamentally, the article rests on an assumption that democracy must follow a linear path toward diminished traditional authority. This reflects a colonial mindset that treats Western liberal democracy as the universal endpoint against which all systems are judged. Tonga’s political system is not a carbon copy of Western models, nor should it be. It is a hybrid form of governance rooted in centuries of Indigenous leadership, spiritual stewardship, and communal responsibility. Democratic legitimacy in Tonga is not derived solely from electoral mechanics, but from a constitutional balance that reflects its history, culture, and lived political realities.
The article further implies that the increased visibility of noble or monarchical influence represents a reversal of the 2010 reforms. This is inaccurate. Those reforms did not dismantle Tonga’s hybrid system or subordinate indigenous institutions to a purely majoritarian model. They recalibrated roles within a constitutional monarchy that was always intended to combine elected representation, noble leadership, and executive oversight. The system was never designed to replicate Western liberal democracy in either form or function.
Criticism of the nobles’ method of selection similarly reflects a misunderstanding of Tonga’s representational logic. Noble representatives are not intended to mirror people’s representatives. They represent culture, estates, land stewardship, and inherited obligations that remain integral to Tonga’s social and political order. Their presence does not negate democratic authority because, constitutionally, they cannot exercise governing power independently of the people’s majority.
Notably absent from the article is any serious examination of structural issues affecting the people’s representatives themselves. Since 2010, many have been elected with less than 50 percent of constituency votes due to candidate fragmentation — and, taken together, the total votes received by all 17 people’s representatives in every election since then have never surpassed the 50 percent threshold of registered voters. In other words, at no point in the past decade and a half has this group collectively secured majority support from the electorate they are said to represent. If democratic legitimacy is the concern, this persistent feature of the electoral system warrants scrutiny equal to — if not greater than — the selective focus on noble participation.
The article also treats declining voter turnout as evidence of democratic erosion. This conclusion is speculative. Labor migration, logistical barriers on polling day, and broader socioeconomic conditions provide far more plausible explanations than the suggestion that voters are disengaging because of the constitutional system itself.
Finally, the article’s portrayal of the monarchy’s involvement in foreign affairs and defense as inherently problematic is misleading. The Constitution does not mandate that these portfolios be held by any particular officeholder; rather, it allows for executive discretion in ministerial appointments. Indeed, these roles have previously been held by individuals outside the Crown during the Pohiva, Tuʻiʻonetoa, and Sovaleni governments, underscoring that their allocation is a matter of political choice, not constitutional constraint. When entrusted to the Crown, these portfolios serve pragmatic purposes—ensuring continuity, stability, and credible sovereign representation in a small state navigating an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific environment. Framing this practice as democratic backsliding ignores both constitutional reality and Tonga’s strategic context.
Tonga is not at a democratic crossroads in the manner suggested. Its system is operating as designed: with ultimate governing authority vested in elected people’s representatives, alongside constitutionally recognized indigenous institutions that reflect the country’s history, culture, and sovereignty. Democratic debate is healthy, but it must be grounded in constitutional accuracy and cultural understanding rather than imported assumptions about what democracy ought to look like.
- Ahongalu Fusimalohi, San Jose, California, USA.