Major weaknesses in Tonga's procurement system [1]
Wednesday, March 3, 2010 - 11:10. Updated on Sunday, May 25, 2014 - 21:59.
Editor,
Tongans will always remember the day the Princess Ashika sunk in the Pacific waters. Just days after the tragedy, I flew over that same ocean on my first trip to Tonga to participate in a discussion of Tonga's corruption and transparency challenges based on recent fieldwork my organization, Global Integrity, had conducted with a team of Tongan researchers and journalists. After hearing the news, my colleague Nathaniel Heller and I were unsure of what we would find when we landed in Nukua'lofa. While so many Tongans we spoke with were obviously grief-stricken, we were most impressed by a sense of perseverance that the people of Tonga embodied. Nathaniel and I left Tonga just as the Royal Commission of Inquiry commenced and have followed the investigation out of both personal and professional interest.
However, as the inquiry has progressed, we were surprised to read the Prime Minister's statement that individuals' decisions, and not institutional government weakness, were to blame for the tragic accident.
The research our Tongan partners compiled in advance of our August 2009 workshop (data that reflects the time period of the Ashika's purchase) clearly point to major weaknesses in Tonga's procurement system that have nothing to do with individuals making poor decisions and everything to do with weak rules of the game. Large-scale procurements are signed with little public or internal oversight, which has been consistently reinforced by the Commission's findings. While procurement committee decisions are overseen by Parliament, the government has rarely made an effort to publicize the results of major government purchases meaning that those outside of government have little opportunity to monitor government procurements.
The Princess Ashika vessel was purchased in spite of serious structural damage, but because the government was not required to share detailed information on procurement decisions with the public, Tongans learned of these structural issues far too late. While the Prime Minister and the Commission of Inquiry may argue that certain individuals within the Ministry of Transport should have done a better job of performing due diligence, the truth is that oversight was remiss due to a lack of clear reporting requirements for procurement decisions both within government and to the public.
While the choices and actions of individual procurement officials undoubtedly played a role in the purchase of a boat unfit for the seas, this tragedy cannot be blamed solely on poor decision-making of a few individuals. The porous legal and regulatory framework is the real culprit. Until Tonga's procurement systems are reformed to establish a clear reporting structure and to require the public announcement of decisions, it is only a matter of time until the next tragedy occurs.
Norah Mallaney,
Global Integrity